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1Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate organizations where the decision makers
are a group of members within the organization and decisions involve changing the group of
members; more specifically, the paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic
decision making in clubs where clubs are taken to be defined by a set of members whose
preferences relate, directly or indirectly, to the set of members in the club.  Democratic
decision taking is interpreted to be majority voting by club members.
The literature on clubs initiated by Buchanan (1965) and further developed by Ng
(1973) and Stiglitz (1977) views clubs as the providers of impure public goods: there is
excludability so that provision may be restricted to members and there is partial rivalness
through crowding and/or congestion.  If the cost of provision is shared among members then
individual preferences over club size will incorporate a trade-off between per capita cost
reductions and increased congestion with increases in size.  Whilst the literature has
concentrated on concrete examples of public good provision, there are many other diverse
examples.  For instance, the costs and benefits of membership of international organizations
like the European Union depends both directly on the set of States which form the Union and
indirectly on the set of States through the decisions they take together relating to, for
example, economic and legal matters.  As can be evidenced by the recent Amsterdam Treaty,
the size and composition of the Union is of dominant concern within the Union.  At a
different level, a trade union or a partnership may also be viewed as a club: it is interested in
ensuring employment and high wages for its members; the larger the union membership, the
more the goal of high wages may need to be compromised to ensure employment.  The
overall effect will be that union members or partners have preferences over the size of the
union.
A club with democratic decision making is a paradigm for organizations where there
is no single decision maker and decisions, particularly about the size of the organization,
involve interests in the different parts of the organization.  An example of this is where a firm
expands by the construction of new plants and managers from these plants are involved in
subsequent decision making. As multiple decision makers is a commonplace, this paper
provides some insight into the growth and size of organizations
The early club literature focussed on (welfare) optimal public good provision and club
1
 Tiebout’s (1956) classic analysis may be viewed as showing that competition between clubs may lead
to optimality even though decisions are taken through a voting process.  The literature on public good provision
and voting can be traced back to Bowen (1943).
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size whereas it is clear that decisions are often taken through the operation of some voting
procedure.1  However, unlike voting over a conventional policy space, voting over club size
gives rise to decisions over time that are time-inconsistent.  A majority of members of a club
may wish to change the club size and then fix it at the new level.  But when the membership
changes, a majority of the reformed club may wish to choose a new club size.  Rational
members will take account of future changes induced by their decisions when initially voting
and this will affect the operation of the voting procedure.  Previous analyses of voting with an
endogenous electorate have ignored the dynamics induced by the voting mechanism.  Stiglitz
(1977) looked at a median voter choice where it is assumed that decisions will not induce
further changes.  Klevorick and Kramer (1973) adopt a similar approach and motivate a
median voter rule by assuming one-period single-peaked preferences over the decision
variable.  Layard (1990) looks at a specific democratic trade union model and, assuming that
voting is equivalent to a median voter choice, provides a restricted analysis of equilibrium
under the assumption of zero discounting.    It is also possible that present decisions affect
future preferences and dynamics can be induced with a fixed electorate.  An example of this
which is fully consistent with forward looking voters is the interesting work of Krusell and
Rios-Rull (1996).
It is well-known that majority voting can fail to produce a ‘preferred’ outcome and
Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows that this problem can be inherited by a very wide class
of voting procedures.  To overcome this, it is common to place restrictions on voters’
preferences which use a dimensionality restriction on the policy space.  Restrictions then take
the form either of limiting individual preferences to be single-peaked (Black (1948)), or of
placing a (single-crossing) restriction across preferences which allows individuals to be
ordered by their marginal preference for the policy variable (Roberts (1977), Grandmont
(1978), Rothstein (1990),Gans and Smart (1996)).  However, with time-inconsistency,
membership size may change many times and it will be impossible to restrict the
2
 It is well-known that single-peakedness is not sufficient to ensure a majority winner when the policy
space is not uni-dimensional and conditions for existence are restrictive e.g. Tullock (1967), Caplin and
Nalebuff (1988).  The single-crossing property is similar to that used a principal agent analysis.  In that
literature, the single-crossing conditions loses much of its usefulness when the dimensionality of the problem
increases. One example of multi-dimensionality, where the dimensionality increases by allowing stochastic
contracts, is Moore (1988).  Variation over state of nature is similar to variation over time as studied here.
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dimensionality of the policy space to apply a single-peakedness or single-crossing property.2
Despite this, a major purpose of this paper is to show that majority winners exist in
dynamic voting problems if a plausible single-crossing condition is satisfied in a one-period
version the problem.  In addition, such a condition allows us to determine the nature of
equilibrium - a median voter result applies even though the median voter is endogenous to
choices that are being made - and the character of steady states and of the transition paths
taken towards a steady state can be exposed.
The model is set up in the next section and section 3 investigates the characteristics of
equilibrium in the model.  The transition paths and steady states associated with equilibrium
are examined in section 4.  In the following two sections, two classes of example are
developed and analysed.  Section 5 looks at ‘expansionist clubs’ where, whatever the size of
the club, a median voter would always prefer an increase in size.  It is suggested that clubs
providing public goods, and the European Union can be viewed as one such example, may
possess this feature.  In contrast, section 6 looks at ‘contractionist clubs’ where median voters
always prefer a reduction in club size and a standard model of a democratic trade union is an
example of this.  Welfare implications of the club decisions are examined in section 7 and
section 8 contains concluding remarks.
2. The Model
We consider a finite group X of infinitely lived individuals who are potential club
members, X = {1,2...x2}.  These individuals always wish to be members of the club though
some may be excluded.  It is assumed that there is a natural seniority system with regard to
membership of the club such that when the club is of size x, its members are the set
{1,2,...,x}.  Thus, at any date t, the club is defined by its size xt.  If at some date the club size






where , the discount factor satisfies 0 <  < 1.  As utilities are defined over a finite set, (1) is
defined as long as  < 1.
Individual utility can be a direct function of club size through the sharing of the cost
of provision of a public good or through congestion effects, and an indirect function of a club
size through decisions taken by a club with a particular membership, e.g. the level of public
good provision.  An example of this will be considered in section 5.  The function u(x, ) is
assumed to incorporate both elements and is assumed to satisfy the following restriction:
Strict Increasing Differences. For all x > x’,  > ’:
u(x, ) - u(x’, ) > u(x, ’) - u(x’, ’) (2)
This assumption is the critical assumption of the model.  It is a discrete version of a single-
crossing or Spence-Mirrlees condition and is sufficient to generate equilibria in static models
of voting (Roberts (1977)), Rothstein (1990), Gans and Smart (1996)). For examples of
dynamic games which utilize the weak and strong form of increasing differences, see
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
The Strict Increasing Differences condition embodies two different aspects.  First, and
most directly, it says that individuals may be ordered by their preference over club size.  This
is a mild assumption.  Second, it says that an individual who prefers a smaller club size will
be admitted to the club before somebody who prefers a larger size.  This feature is often
implied by more primitive considerations of preferences (see section 6 below) or follows
naturally from the problem under investigation.  For instance, in the case of the potential
expansion eastwards of the European Union, it is natural to believe that countries have a
preference to be towards the “centre” of the Union; in this case, more easterly countries have
a greater preference for an eastwards expansion and geographical location induces both a
ranking for admittance and a preference over size.  
The club size can vary over time.  We restrict attention to situations that give rise to
3
  The third argument of V is the function y rather than the value of y evaluated at some x.
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Markov transition rules y that map from X to X: a transition rule defines the path of x
recursively such that for all t:  xt+1 = y(xt).  If there is an x such that x = y(x) then x is a steady
state.  The rule y(.) can be a deterministic rule but it is also permitted to be stochastic.  If
individual ’s discounted utility under y(.), starting at x, is given by V(x, ,y) then V is defined
recursively by3
V(x, ,y) = u(x, ) + V(y(x), ,y) (3)
If y(.) is stochastic then (1) is assumed to be the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
and the second term in the right-hand side of (4) is replaced by an expectation over V.
An individual’s preferences over club size will be given by V and will be conditional
on the transition rule y(.).  We first define a
Markov Voting Equilibrium MVE.  Given any transition rule y*(.), for each x  X, let Y*(x)
be the set of y such that for all z  X:
# { :  # x & V(y, ,y*) > V(z, ,y*)}
(4)
$ # { ,  # x & V(y, ,y*) < V(z, ,y*)}
If y*(x)  Y*(x) for all x then y*(.) is an MVE.
This condition says that, given that y*(.) is followed in the future, no club size defeats
y*(x) in pairwise majority voting as the choice for the next period - y*(x) is the Condorcet
winner for the club of size x.  (If y*(.) is stochastic then (4) must hold for all realisations of
y*(.) that occur with non-zero probability).  Voting for the state that maximises V is a weakly
dominant strategy for each member - there are degenerate Nash equilibria where, for instance,
everybody votes for the status quo (because no single member can disrupt such an outcome)
but such possibilities are ruled out by assumption.   Note that as the electorate at t+1 will be
{1,...y*(xt)}, the majority winner chosen by this group will in general be different to that
chosen by {1,....xt} and so y*(y*(xt)) may differ from y*(xt).
In the next section we will wish to compare an MVE with a median-voter rule where,
6for every club size, an individual with median seniority chooses the club size for the next
period.  A median voter is a function m(.) such that, at club size x, m(x) is (x+1)/2 when x is
odd and either x/2 or (x/2)+1 when x is even.  The group of individuals both below and above
the median voter, including the median voter, constitute a weak majority.
We can now define a
Median Voter Rule.  Given any transition rule y:(.), for each x  X, let Y˜ (x) be the set of y
such that for all z  X:
x odd: V(y,m(x),y:) $ V(z,m(x),y:)
x even: either V(x,m(x),y:) $ V(z,m(x),y:) for each m(x) (5)
or V(x,m(x),y:) > V(z,m(x),y:) for some m(x)
If y:(x)  Y˜ (x) for all x then y:(.) is a median voter rule.
The connection between an MVE and a median voter rule will be investigated in the next
section.
3. Equilibrium
The difficulty in the analysis of voting equilibria comes from the dynamics induced by
a changing electorate.  Consider, first, what would happen if a club of size x could choose a
new size which would be implemented forever.  In this case, preferences would be based
upon instantaneous utility and the median voter choice y: would satisfy (applying (5)):
x odd: u(y:,m(x)) $ u(z,m(x))
x even:  either u(y:,m(x)) $ u(z,m(x)) for each m (6)
or u(y:,m(x)) > u(z,m(x)) for some m.
Such a y: exists as X is finite: trivially when x is odd, and when x is even, let y: be a best
choice for m(x) = (x/2)+1 from among the best outcomes for m(x) = x/2.  Assume that y: > z
for some z (the alternative case z > y: is treated similarly).  Applying the strict increasing
differences condition, we have
4
 A straightforward presentation of this approach and a formal statement of results is to be found in









u(y:, ) > u(z, ) (7)
for all  > x+1, x odd, and  > x, x even - both median voters cannot be indifferent when
                  2                           2
x is even.  Thus
# { :  # x & u(y:, ) > u(z, )}$#{ , #x&u(y:, ) < u(z, )} (8)
and y: will be a (majority) voting equilibrium: a voting equilibrium exists which is a median
voter rule.  This is, in essence, the approach taken in Roberts (1977).4
When future club sizes are not fixed, the situation is less straightforward.  Assume
that if a club size of y1 is chosen next period then there will be very little future variability
whereas the opposite is true if y2 is chosen.  There will be a tendency for individuals with
more concave utility functions to prefer y1 and those with less concave functions to prefer y2. 
But as concavity bears no necessary relationship to increasing differences, there will be no
natural order of preference across individuals and y2 may be chosen over y1 because it is
preferred by a coalition of low  and high  individuals whereas a median voter prefers y1 to
y2.
To proceed, we look at the implications of the increasing differences condition with
regard to variable club sizes and then consider whether the dynamic path of club sizes that
result from an MVE can be restricted.  A straightforward implication of increasing
differences is:
Lemma 1.     Given any x  X, let (y0,....,yt,...) be a sequence such that yt  X and yt $ x(yt
< x, resp.) for all t, yt > x(yt < x, resp.) for some t.  If an individual  weakly prefers a
constant x to the stream (yt) then there is strict preference for all ’, ’ < ( ’ > , resp.):









Proof. We consider the case where yt $ x.  Using increasing differences, we have
u(yt ) - u(x, ) $ u(yt, ’) - u(x, ’)
with the inequality strict from some t.  Weighting by t and summing over all t gives (9) 
An immediate strengthening of Lemma 1 is
Lemma 1’.   Let (y0,y1,....),(y’0,y’1,....) be two sequences such that y’t $ yt (y’t # yt resp.)
for all t with the inequality strict from some t.  If an individual weakly prefers the
stream (yt) to the stream (y’t) then there is strict preference of (yt) over (y’t) for all ’, ’ <
,( ’ > , resp.).  
We now turn our attention to the characteristics of an MVE, y*, and a median voter rule, y:. 
The following result is central to our characterization (proofs not provided in the text are
given in the Appendix).
Proposition 1.  Consider a dynamic path (yt) generated by an MVE, y*: yt+1 = y*(yt ), t $
0 or by a median voter rule y:: yt+1 = y:(yt), t $ 0.  It is impossible that either y0 > y1 # yt, t
$ 2 with y1 < y   for some  $ 2 or  y0 < y1 $ yt, t $ 2 with y1 > yt for some  $ 2 (if y* is
stochastic then there are no strictly positive probability realisations of this form).
Proposition 1 rules out extreme turning points in the size of club membership.  We
use it first to investigate the occurrence of cycles.  A transition rule y(.) generates a cycle if
there is a dynamic path (yt), yt+1 = y(yt) for all t $ 0, such that ys=yt, s < t and y  =*  ys,yt for








Proposition 2.  An MVE transition rule y* generates no cycles and a median voter rule y:
generates no cycles.  
This result follows from Proposition 1. If there is a cycle then let x be the lowest membership
size belonging to the cycle.  If y(.) is the transition rule then x = y(x’) for some x’ > x
(equality is ruled out because x would then be a steady state (x = y(x)) which rules out a
cycle).  If y(.) is stochastic then there is a strictly positive realisation with these properties. 
From the definition of x, the transition path (yt) starting at x’(y0 = x’) satisfies the property
that y0 > y1 # yt, t $ 2 with y1 < yt for some t, e.g. t = 2.  Using Proposition 1, cycles are not
possible if the transition rule is an MVE or a median voter rule.
Proposition 2 shows that the transition rules under consideration do not give rise to a
perpetual cycle and, as x is finite, the dynamic paths generated by y* and y: must, in a finite
time, reach a steady state x, x = y (x) where y(.) is y*(.) or y:(.).  An induction argument,
moving backwards from a steady state, allows us to apply Proposition 1 to show that
transitions to a steady state must involve a degree of monotonicity.  
Proposition 3.  Let (yt) be a dynamic path generated by an MVE or a median voter rule.
Then the path is monotonic:
for all t, ,  > t.
Proposition 3 does not show that all dynamic paths are monotonic in the same direction and
we will see in Section 4 that commonly there will be a mixture of monotonically increasing
and decreasing paths.  What can be shown is that paths do not cross and this is shown by a
similar induction argument to that used to prove Proposition 3:  
Proposition 4.  If (yt) and (y’t) are dynamic paths generated by an MVE or a median
voter rule then y0 $ y’0 => yt $ y’t for all t $ 0.
10
These results show that majority voting and median voter transition rules are not ‘too exotic’
and possess similar properties.  They also allow us to tie together the two rules.
Proposition 5.  An MVE transition rule y* is a median voter rule y: and vice versa.
This result has three purposes.  First, it allows a simple characterization of an MVE.  Second,
the computation of an MVE in any example is greatly eased by the ability to concentrate on
median voter rules.  Third, the result allows us to tackle the issue of the existence of
appropriate transition rules; thus far, our results have been predicated on the assumption that
rules exist.  Our route to the existence of Markov Voting Equilibria will be based upon
showing first that median voting rules exist by constructing a normal form game where Nash
equilibria correspond to median voter rules.
Proposition 6.   A (possibly stochastic) median voter rule y: (.) exists.
A combination of Propositions 5 and 6 give us a voting equilibrium existence result.
Proposition 7.   A Markov Voting Equilibrium MVE exists.
The equilibrium may involve mixed strategies.  In a similar though simpler problem of
bequest games, Leininger (1986) has shown the existence of pure strategy equilibria under
plausible conditions.  Under a weak further restriction on preferences, it is possible to show
that transition rules have a recursive structure which permits us to show that pure strategy
equilibria exist.  We return to this issue when we have better understood the dynamics paths
generated by transition rules (see Proposition 15 below).
4. Steady States and Transition Paths
We have seen that, starting from any level of club size, a steady state is attained in finite time









and transition paths in greater detail.
It is easiest to uncover the structure of MVEs by looking at median voter rules.  Given
an x let µ(x) be the club size that would be optimal for a median voter who could commit the
club not to change its size in the future.  Then we have:
x odd: µ(x) = argmax u(.,x+1) (11)
                                                                 2
x even: µ(x)  [µ*,µ**] (12)
where
µ* = argmax u(.,x/2) µ** = argmax u(.,(x/2)+1)
                                       
For the purpose of illustration, Figure 1 plots an example of µ(x) with x treated as a
continuous variable.  The monotonicity of µ(x) follows from the condition of strict increasing
differences.
4.1 Steady States
Consider a club size like x* in Figure 1 where µ is unique.  We have
u(x*,m(x*)) > u(x,m(x*)) for all x, x =*  x* (13)
Let y:(.) be the median voter transition rule.  Now, if y:(x*)  =*  x* then
V(x*,m(x*),y:) = u(x*,m(x*)) + V(y:(x*),m(x*),y:) > V(y:(x*),m(x*),y:) (14)
as from (13)
As (14) violates (5), we have:
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steady state of an MVE.
The intuition is straightforward - if a club size is reached which the median voter
views as optimal then he will not wish to vote for a change in its size and, as he is a median
voter, he can always enlist a majority in ensuring no change.  We call such a position an
extrinsic steady state because it is a steady state irrespective of the transition rule adopted
away from this state.  In Figure 1 there are three extrinsic steady states.
Are there steady states other than extrinsic steady states?  Consider a situation where
µ(x*) = µ(x*+1) = µ(x*+2) = x*
µ(x*+3) = x*+2   (16)
µ(x*+k) = x*+5, k $ 4
Here, x* is an extrinsic steady state.  When the club size is x*+1 or x*+2, the median voter
will choose a club size of x* in the knowledge that x* will be chosen forever and this must
dominate any other choice. At a club size of x*+3, a decision to increase the size to x*+4 will
lead the then median voter to raise it to x*+5 in the knowledge that it will remain at that level
forever; on the other hand, a decision to reduce the club size to x*+2 say, will then lead to it
falling to x*.  Let the median voter at x*+3 have preferences of the form.
u(x,m(x*+3)) = -(x-(x*+2))2     (17)
The future discounted utility of m(x*+3) from changing the club size is:
5
 It is possible to have steady states as corner solutions, e.g. at x2 with µ(x2) > x2.  For interpretation
purposes, such a steady state can be viewed as being extrinsic.
6
 Of course, there is no guarantee that S exists as there may be a discontinuity at =1.
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The optimal rule is
1) No change if   $ ¼
2) Reduce to x*+2 if  < ¼
If discounting is not too high, the club level of x*+3 is a steady state even though the median
voter would prefer a smaller club and this proves
Proposition 9.  There can be steady states of an MVE which involve club sizes that are
sub-optimal for the median voter at that club size.
Such steady states will be referred to as intrinsic steady states because they are
sustained as steady states by the transition rule operated away from the steady state rather than
by the preferences of the median voter for that steady state.5  The example developed to show
Proposition 9 also makes clear the role of discounting:
Proposition 10. If  is sufficiently small then there are no intrinsic steady states.
To see this, note that, with  small, the choice by m(x) of a utility maximising club
size followed by any dynamic path dominates any other possibility.
As steady states are reached in finite time, low discounting implies that the value of a
dynamic path is dominated by the value of the steady state that will be reached.  We thus have:
Proposition 11.  If S is the set of steady states for all values of the discount factor close to
unity, then6
(i) x  S => u(x,m(x)) $ u(z,m(x)) Ø z  S
(19)
7
 This is the same as single peakedness but its role here is different because it is still the case that V
may not be single-peaked in its first argument.
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(ii) x  X/S => u(x,m(x)) # u(z,m(x)) for some z  S.
Proof.  To show (i), assume that u(x,m(x)) < u(z,m(x)) for some x  S.  Then at a club size of
x, the median voter would gain from changing the club size to z rather than remaining at x. 
This is true whatever the discount factor.  To show (ii), note that if u(z,m(x)) < u(x,m(x)) for
all z  S then with  close to unity, all dynamic paths will be inferior to remaining at x 
For an open and dense set of utility functions (in the Euclidean metric) the inequalities
in Proposition 11 will be strict and the set S will be defined by the given inequalities. 
Proposition 9 will then become an ‘if and only if’ statement and the inequalities will provide a
method for computing sets of steady states of voting equilibria.
4.2 Transition Paths
We now investigate transition paths and, in particular, transitions when close to a
steady state.  It is convenient to assume that µ(x) captures one period preferences - the median
voter prefers sizes closer to µ(x).  We thus adopt the following assumption: 
Strict Quasi-Concavity (SQC):7 Each individual has a strictly quasi-concave utility function
u(., ).
Consider, first, an extrinsic steady state x* and consider some x’ above x*.  Assume that for
all x, x* < x # x’:
µ(x) < x (20)
(recall that µ(x*) = x*).  Given (20), the median voter at (x*+1) most prefers a club size of x*
and this choice, as it involves x* then being chosen forever must dominate any other dynamic
path.  At (x*+2), the median voter most prefers a club size of x* or x*+1.  Given SQC, any
dynamic path starting above (x*+2) is dominated by choosing (x*+2) until the path drops
below (x*+2) and then replicating it.  The same applies to paths starting below x*.  Thus, the
15
median voter at (x*+2) always chooses a club size between x* and (x*+2).  The same
argument applies inductively for all x up to x’ and a similar argument then applies below x*.
Proposition 12.  Assume SQC and let x* be an extrinsic steady state.  If µ(x) < x for all x,
x* < x # x’ then y*(x’) [x*,x’].  Similarly, if µ(x) > x for all x, x” # x < x* then
y*(x”) [x”,x*].  Under these conditions, the steady state is an attractor.
Returning to Figure 1, the two extrinsic steady states other than x* will be attractors.
The alternative situation is when µ(x) > x for all x, x* < x # x’ where x* is an extrinsic
steady state.  If it is optimal to reduce the club size from x’ then, as the MVE is monotonic (in
the sense of Proposition 3), it will continue to fall and this path will be inferior for the median
voter to remaining at x’ or, perhaps, to allowing the club size to increase.
Proposition 13.   Assume SQC and let x* be an extrinsic steady state.  If µ(x) > x for all x,
x* < x # x’ then y*(x’)  [x’,x2].   Similarly, if µ(x) < x for all x, x” # x < x* then
y*(x’) [0,x”].  Under these conditions, the steady state is a repeller.
In Figure 1, x* is a repeller steady state.  In Proposition 12 and 13, it is not guaranteed
that movement will be towards or away from the steady state: club sizes close to the steady
state may be intrinsic steady states.  However, let us now examine gradualism where voting
involves changes over a number of periods before a steady state is reached.  In particular, let
us look at the conditions under which the club size changes by the minimal amount (unity)
each period until the steady state is attained.  Let utilities be of the form



























































































































































































 As noted in the last section, a corner steady state at x2 is best interpreted as extrinsic so (31) implies























































































 When agents are not members, the increasing differences will not be strict.  The results of previous




























































































 However, as a society may respect the welfare only of the living when decisions about population
policy are taken, (37) may be reasonable in such contexts.
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,y¯) $ V(z, x%1
2
,y¯) (A.15)
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